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I n 2002, the White House published the National Security Strategy. Rather than focusing exclusively on milital)'operations, the strategy is comprehensive and 
recognizes that acts ranging from poverty reduction to disease eradication will 
contribute to America's national security. However, one of the most crucial com -
ponents of the National Security Strategy which will impact virtually all other com-
ponents is the worldwide implementation of the rule oflaw. I In furtherance of the 
National Security Strategy, National Security Presidential Directive 44 was issued 
in late 2005 and states that it is US policy to work with other countries toward effec-
tive implementation ofthe rule oflaw.2 The directive tasks the Secretaries of State 
and Defense with coordinating rule of law efforts and with integrating them into 
military contingency plans. Consequently, by direction of the President, the mili-
tary has a key role to play in implementing the rule oflaw and judge advocates OAs) 
must be prepared to lead these efforts . 
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Commanders look to JAs with the expectation that they will be competent and 
innovative in implementing the unit's rule oflaw mission.3 This is d early demon-
strated by the Center for Law and Military Operations' publication of the Rule of 
LAw Handbook: A Practitioner's Guide for }udgeAdvocates (Rule of LAw Handbook ), 
where a "constantly re-occurring theme" is that "the command naturally turns to 
the legal expert within the task force to plan. execute, coordinate. and evaluate rule 
of law efforts."4 
Over six years of operations in Afghanistan. during which commanders have re-
lied on JAs in their rule ofl aw operations, have created a number oflessons learned; 
this paper will highlight three: 
• Rule of law operations must be totally integrated into all phases and aspects 
of military operations and the unit mission; 
• US Army rule of law efforts must be completely coordinated and 
synchronized with other rule of law efforts, especially those of the host nation, and 
must recognize what role the military is organizationally qualified to ftll; and 
• Military rule oflaw operations must be effects-based. 
Before addressing these lessons learned. it is important to highlight the discus-
sion surrounding the definition of rule oflaw. There are divergent, and often con-
fli cting, views among academics. US government agencies. US allies and even 
within the Department of Defense. on what is meant by the rule oflaw.5 This defi-
nitional ambiguity allows two organizations or individuals to be deeply committed 
to accomplishing rule oflaw tasks. yet proceed in diametrically opposed directions. 
Additionally, it is important to discuss the obligation that international law cre-
ates to conduct rule of law operations. Recent court decisions such as those of the 
United Kingdom's House of Lords in Al-}edda/' the European Court of Hwnan 
Rights cases from KOSOV07 and Canada's Amnesty International v. Canada8 have re-
lied on Security Council resolutions to determine the substance and extent oflegal 
obligations imposed on armed forces. The United Nations Securi ty Council has 
signaled through several resolutions9 that supporting and promoting rule oflaw 
initiatives are not only permissible. but are obligations that participants in armed 
conflict are required to fulfill. It is incumbent on US forces to be aware of these 
emerging practices and recognize that these obligations will likely follow any 
armed conflict, whether brought on by reason of occupation or some other theory. 
With international law imposing additional obligations to carry out rule of law op-
erations, it is more crucial than ever to catalogue lessons learned. analyze their ap-
plication to doctrine and ensure that the US military is conducting its rule oflaw 
operations appropriately. 
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1. To Be Effective, Rule of Law Operations Must Be Totally Integrated into All 
Phases and Aspects of Military Operations and the Unit Mission 
In the aftermath of World War II, the US military embarked on a massive rule of 
law project that continued for years and involved a large pool of military resources. 
However, as the Cold War heated up, the focus transitioned from rebuilding a dev-
astated Europe to defending a reconstructed Europe from attack. As a result, the 
focus of military doctrine, training, manning and equipping also adapted to this 
new environment. While this adaptation was necessary, it drew resources and ex-
pertise away from rule oflaw capabilities. Over the subsequent decades, resources, 
experience and training remained focused in other areas. The result was that JAs 
who deployed to Afghanistan felt as though they were working in an emerging area 
of doctrine without guidance or training. IO 
This was felt not only by lAs, but by the Army as a whole. The lack of doctrine 
and guidance was a significant lesson learned from early operations and sparked a 
number of initiatives and actions that have tried to remedy this doctrinal and train-
ing gap. These efforts have included a somewhat circular process of (1) analyzing 
lessons learned from military operations, (2) rewriting doctrine to include princi-
ples drawn from these lessons, (3) including this doctrine in mission training and 
mission rehearsal exercises at combat training centers and then (4) collecting les-
sons learned from the application of new doctrine in actual military operations 
which can then be reviewed and fed back into the doctrine review process. 
The first step in this process-analysis-led to the recognition that rule oflaw 
efforts needed to be reintegrated into Army doctrine. The second step, rewriting 
doctrine to reflect this recognition, is well illustrated by several publications that 
emerged after the initial stages of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most 
recent loint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, divides military opera-
tions into three categories: offensive operations, defensive operations and stability 
operations.11 Promoting stability operations to the same level as offense and de-
fense is a dramatic change from a Cold War paradigm where defending the Fulda 
Gap against an invasion by Warsaw Pact forces was the primal)' focus . 
The importance of stability operations is echoed in the 2005 Department of De-
fense Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, which states: 
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense 
shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to 
combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all [Department 
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of Defense] activities including doctrine, organization, training, education, exercises, 
materiel, leadership, personnel, facil ities, and planning. 12 
Rule oflaw operations are an essential subset of stability operations. Declaring 
stability operations to be a core US military mission has driven an increase in the 
expenditure of training resources and has changed the planning and execution 
stages to ensure units can accomplish rule of law missions. 
Doctrine has also been rewritten to reflect the roles the military should be pre-
pared to fulfill to further the rule oflaw. One change in doctrine acknowledges that 
the mili tary may be called upon to playa supporting governance role. Joint Publi-
cation 3-0 discusses the various phases of an operation, the last two of which are 
"stabilize" and "enable civil authority." To complete these last two phases, "[ t [he 
joint force maybe required to perform limited local governance, integrating the ef-
forts of other supporting/contributing m ultinational, [other government agencies, 
international government agencies, or nongovernmental agencies (NGOs)], par-
ticipants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or 
assisting in the provision of basic selVices to the population."13 Further, "The joint 
force will be in a supporting role to the legitimate civil authority in the region 
throughout the 'enable civil authority' phase."14 
Current doctrine also recognizes that the military can aid rule of law develop-
ment by creating security, a prerequisite for the rule oflaw, and a fundamental mil-
itary mission throughout all phases of an operation. Depending on the 
circumstances, " it may be the only real contribution that US forces can make to-
wards implementing the rule oflaw."15 Experience has taught that, for a multitude 
of reasons, there is a direct correlation between the establishment of a safe and se-
cure environment and the ability to accomplish rwe of law objectives. Achieving 
such an environment requires in-depth planning from the very earliest stages of 
the operation. 
Finally, military doctrine has changed to recognize that US forces promote the 
rwe of law when their own actions, across the spectrum of military operations, re-
inforce the legitimacy of the rule of law even before a stable environment has been 
created. The Rule of Law Handbook accuratclystates that "[a[ command's ability to 
establish the rule of law within its area of control is dependent in large part on its 
0W11 compliance with legal rules restricting soldiers' (and the command's own) dis-
cretion." 16 This idea is echoed in the Center for Army Lessons Learned compilation 
on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations which states that "[m ]ilitary actions 
[must be] conducted in consonance with specified civil rights, liberties, and objec-
tives."l7 The only way to do that is to ensure that rule oflaw considerations are an 
essential part of the unit mission and intertwined with all mili tary operations and 
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training. EvelY soldier, sailor, airman and Marine must recognize that his or her 
actions can have a profound effect on the success of the national strategic interest 
in supporting rule oflaw operations throughout the world. 
To effectively carry out these and other doctrinal changes, the Army has trans-
formed its combat training centers into stability operations training grounds. The 
National Training Center in California, loint Readiness Training Center in Louisi-
ana and loint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany have all incorporated 
stability operations, including rule oflaw operations, into their training scenarios. 
Units routinely conduct "mission rehearsal exercises" at these locations to prepare 
themselves for the actual events that will take place in an impending deployment to 
Afghanistan or Iraq. This training not only incorporates the new stability opera-
tions doctrine, but also the most recent lessons learned from units currently de-
ployed. With this training, units are better prepared to deploy to Afghanistan and 
similar environments and support rule of law operations. 
The importance of promoting and complying with the rule of law has been 
clearly stated in almost every "lesson learned" from deployed units. The doctrine is 
now in place and in the process of continual review based on continuing feedback 
from current military operations. Furthermore, mechanisms for implementing the 
doctrine, such as training at the combat maneuver training centers, are also in 
place. What remains is for the doctrine to be implemented on the ground, ensuring 
that these legal lessons are truly learned, not lost. 
II. US Anny Rule of Law Efforts Must Be Completely Coordinated and 
Synchronized with Other Rule of Law Efforts, Especially Those of the Host 
Nation. and Must Recognize What Role the Military Is 
Organizntionally Qualified to Fill 
Because rule oflaw efforts are so complex, they are most effective when all contrib-
uting groups, especially the host nation, coordinate with one another rather than 
inadvertently working at cross purposes. The Rule of Law Handbook illustrates this 
point: 
Rule of law operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have repeatedly demonstrated that rule 
of law practitioners who seek to coordinate efforts, funding, and resources with other 
agencies and organizations yield the most effective results .. .. [A)s hostilities come to a 
dose other [US Government) agencies .. . will arrive in theater. Regional, state-based 
economic and security organizations such as the Gulf Cooperative Council or the 
Organization for Securi ty and Cooperation in Europe . . . may have a presence. The 
United Nations may, depending upon the operation have a presence, as may 
nongovernmental agencies with an interest in human rights and justice. Each of these 
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organizations is a tool and potential force multiplier for the rule of law Judge Advocate 
to maximize the effect of his efforts. IS 
Unfortunately, the US military and the world at large had not yet learned this 
lesson when operations began in Afghanistan: 
Pursuant to the Bonn Agreement. the rule oflaw effort in Afghanistan was organized 
by a "lead nation" approach. with different countries taking the lead in developing 
different aspects of the rule of law in Afghanistan. Germany became the lead nation for 
developing the Afghan police force, while Italy was given responsibility for developing 
the judicial sector . . .. The split international effort has proven unwieldy for many 
reasons, since a rule oflaw effort has to address police and judicial reform in concert .... 
[and] the division of tasks among nations did not ntX:essarily match the structure of the 
Afghan government's legal administrative apparatus. 19 
Not only is the lead-nation approach unwieldy, it has not been well received by 
Afghanistan. The 2008 Paris Conference made it dear that Afghanistan is the lead 
nation for Afghanistan's rule oflaw initiatives. This led to a change in approach by 
interested nations and caused some adaptation to the lead-nation concept,20 
This incongruent approach on the international level was little different from 
the approach at the US national level . US agencies involved in rule oflaw opera-
tions in Afghanistan include the Department of State , the Office of the Coordina-
tor for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the Bureau for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID ), the Department of Justice, the United States Insti-
tute for Peace, the Department of Defense (indudingjudge advocates, civil affairs 
personnel, military police and Provincial Reconstruction Teams),21 the Defense 
Institute of International Legal Studies and the Combined Security Transition 
Command-Afghanistan . One lesson learned that has been constant throughout 
the operation in Afghanistan, and has been emphasized as recently as the fall of 
2007, is that all these organizations are working hard, but their efforts are not well 
coordinated. 
This lack of concerted effort on rule of law operations was noted early in Af-
ghanistan operations and the US government has taken steps to try and solve this 
problem. As previously mentioned, the Department of Defense promulgated Joint 
Publication 3-0 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, both of which draw 
attention to the necessity of interagency and intergovernmental cooperation for 
long-term success.22 In December 0(2005, President Bush promulgated National 
Security Presidential Directive 44, which recognizes the prior lack of coordination 
and states: 
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To achieve maximum effect, a focal point is needed (i) to coordinate and strengthen 
efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct 
reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations 
that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities 
and (ii) to hannonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.ll 
The directive then identifies who will be responsible for this coordination, stating: 
The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government 
efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to 
prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The 
Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure 
harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the 
spectrum of conflict.24 
This directive was followed by the creation of the Department of State, Office of 
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in August 2004. The mission 
oftheS/CRS is "[t]o lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian 
capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and 
reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a 
sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy."2S 
The S/CRS acknowledges the difficulty in harmonizing efforts in this area. Its 
website proclaims: 
Until now, the international community has undertaken stabilization and 
reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating the tools and relationships 
each time a crisis arises. If we are going to ensure that countries are set on a sustainable 
path towards peace, democracy and a market economy, we need new, institutionalized 
foreign policy tool.s-tools that can influence the choices countries and people make 
about the nature of their economies, their political systems, their se(:urity, indeed, in 
some cases about the very social fabric of a nation.26 
Unfortunately, neither the establishment of the S/CRS nor any other initiative 
by the Department of Defense, Department of State or any other agency has been 
sufficient to create a synchronized approach to rule oflaw in Afghanistan, even af-
ter almost seven years of rule of law operations. 
It would be unfair to attribute this failure either to the Department of State or to 
the Department of Defense, or to any other single factor for that matter. But there 
are d early some lessons that have been learned by the US Army. The first is that any 
successful rule of law initiative must be host-nation driven. If the people and gov-
ernments (whether local, regional or national) of Afghanistan are not consulted, or 
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fail to embrace proposed rule of law operations, not only are the operations 
doomed to failure, they will not promote the strategic interests of the United States. 
Conversely, when Afghanis and the Afghan government are a part of a cooperative 
effort, great progress can be made. One such example of a successful rule oflaw col-
laboration with the host nation is the creation of the Provincia1 Justice Conferences 
(PJC) program in Afghanistan: 
The Provincial lustice Conferences (PICs) program attempts to [bring Government of 
Afghanistan (GoA)] justice officials from Kabul to meet their counterparts in the 
provinces to discuss the obstacles to delivery of justice services to the province and to 
identity solutions that can be instituted expediently and in a cost-effective way. Follow-
up PICs are generally scheduled within a period of three to six months to check on 
progress made on the identified solutions and to discuss outstanding issues. One 
essential key to a successful PIC has been the invitation and inclusion of all interested 
[US government (USC)[ agencies, the international community, and NGO 
representatives. Each agency or organization has the benefit of significant, specialized, 
and diverse experience. With the inclusion of as many subject-matter experts as 
possible, new ideas may emerge to correct persistent problems. 
As of the fITst quarter of 2007, PICs and follow-up PICs [had[ been conducted in six 
provinces in Afghanistan. The first PJCs drew small attendance from among the 
provincial justice officials, but more recent PICs have drawn upwards of 150 people 
from the national, provincial, and district levels. and, in some cases, from neighboring 
provinces. A typical PIC program consists of several distinct parts. First, all participants 
are taken on a tour of justice facilities in the provincial capital, to include the prison, 
police headquarters/detention centers, judges' office, prosecutor's office, courthouse, 
and defense counsel offices (if any). This feature gives participants a first-hand view of 
the justice infrastructure and an opportunity to observe justice officials in their own 
environments. Second, a general session of all participants is convened and hosted by 
the provincial governor. Brief comments from the governor, justice officials, and USCI 
international participants are presented. After a communal lunch, hosted by one or 
more of the USC participants, conferees are divided into groups representing their 
individual justice interests--police, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and prison 
administrators. These groups discuss specialized problems and their potential 
solutions. The small groups take notes on their discussions from which a mark plan can 
be developed. Finally, the small group leaders from either GoA or the provincial 
government present summaries of their discussions to a final general session at the end 
oftheday.27 
Organizing a PIC is a difficult and time-consuming process and becomes more 
so as the organizing rule oflaw officer attempts to include all interested agencies. 
However, it is this type of coordination and inclusion that links agency resources 
with the Afghanis who are attempting to create the rule oflaw in courtrooms and 
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police stations. This host-nation lead in rule of law programs is vital to their con-
tinued vitality and eventual success. 
A second lesson is that the military is not the most qualified or appropriate body 
to conduct many aspects of rule of law operations. Department of Defense Direc-
tive 3000.05 recognizes this and states, "[ m Jany stability operations tasks are best 
performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals."28 There are sim-
ply tasks that the military is not the most qualified to perform. A recent after-action 
review highlights this point: 
The military possesses an organizational culture that is different from the rest of the 
interagency. The military skill sets are required in order to establish the rule of law 
initially, and then other elements of national power are better suited to restore 
economic and industrial power. Two main points of understanding are (I) civilians are 
not in the military chain of command and do not accept military leadership and (2) 
civilians cannot be ordered to do anything. The interagency operates on the unity of 
effort, while the military prefers unity of command.29 
Additionally, it would simply be counterproductive for the mili tary to undertake 
certain tasks, as doing so could create reliance on military action by the host nation 
and others. 
Despite the mili tary's inherently limited ability to implement the rule oflaw, in 
the absence of other options, the military may find it necessary to step into a vac-
uum in order to ensure that certain necessary tasks are accomplished. Department 
of Defense Directive 3000.05 also recognizes this side of the coin and, after recog-
nizing that many stability operations are ideally left to others, states that, 
"[ n Jonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary 
to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do SO."30 While few would 
likely quibble with this statement, applying it is more difficult, especially determin-
ing when the time is right for the military to step up and perform these tasks as op-
posed to waiting for others. This difficult decision must be made and made 
competently by commanders and JAs on the ground using their best judgment. 
A third lesson is that the rule oflaw is more effectively implemented when all 
players act in concert. JAs need to plan for and work within the multinational and 
interagency environment in order to maximize efficiency, effectiveness and en-
gagement. If the US military doesn't function within the joint. interagency and 
multinational environment when forwarding rule oflaw initiatives. it simply does 
not func tion effectively. As the Rule of Law Handbook accurately states, "[wJ hat is 
agreed upon by almost every individual who has worked in this area is that joint, 
inter-agency, and multinational coordination is the basic fo undation upon which 
all rule of law efforts must be built."3l And further: 
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Without coordination with other players in the rule of law arena, the efforts of a single 
contributor in isolation are at best less than optimal and at worst counterproductive to 
the overall rule of law reform objectives being pursued. Quite simply, coordination and 
synchronization is to the rule of law effort what fires and maneuver is to the high 
intensity conflictP 
As the Army internalizes this, it will be better able to coordinate with other 
agencies. 
Despite initial and contin uing difficul ties, there have been instances in which 
the military has worked successfully with other agencies to create positive results. 
The following illustration from the Rule of Law Handbook is based on lessons 
learned through after-action reviews. While lengthy, it demonstrates quite dearly 
the increased likelihood of success for rule oflaw operations when a broad range of 
parties are involved. 
Nowhere was the interagency success more evident than the justice sector 
achievements in the Wardak province known as the Wardak Model Justice Project. In 
late 2005, the Justice 5e<:tor Support Program OSSP), a contractor of the [Department 
of State (DOS)] International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (INL), 
began a training program for provincial and district level judges and prosecutors in 
Maydan Wardak. Almost simultaneously, but without advanced coordination, DOD 
rule of law and [Civil Affairs (CA)] personnel teamed up to build a justice 
administration building in Maydan Shar. Using [Commander's Emergency Response 
Program (CERPl] funds. available to tactical commanders for urgent and 
humanitarian rebuilding projects in post-conflict Mghanistan and Iraq, the 
[Combined Forces Command-Mghanistan (CFC-Al] rule of law and CA team 
obtained the blueprints for a generic administration building from USAID. USAID 
was using the blueprints to build up to 40 provincial courthouses throughout 
Mghanistan. Using these blueprints, CFC-A began construction in early 2006 on the 
justice administration building in Maydan Shar. 
Momentum gathered as the people of May dan Wardakgenerated more enthusiasm for 
the improvements being made. The USG agencies began to look more carefully at each 
other's rule oflaw activities in Maydan Wardak, and, aided by strong leadership on the 
Special Committee for the Rule of Law[,] began a concerted coordination effort to 
build on those successes. Lessons learned were shared among the Special Counseloron 
the Rule of Law agency representatives, resulting in more efficient delivery of proposed 
projects. 
USAlD began construction on a new courthouse, and one of its contractors offered to 
introduce its new paper-based court administration system in Maydan Shar. CFC-A 
also provided a justice motor-pool (with maintenance and fuel packages) and 
sponsored a public awareness campaign to let the citizens of the province know the 
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steps being taken to improve the delivery of justice services. At the same time, CFC-A 
contracted with an Afghan NCO to provide defense counsel services to criminal 
defendants in Wardak and five other provinces. Ultimately, building on the combined 
efforts of the other USG agencies, the DOS announced in late 2006 that it would build a 
new, state-of-the-art prison and national corrections training facility in Maydan 
Wardak. The result of the ongoing combined efforts of these agencies was the Wardak 
Model Justice Project, the name reflecting the goal of the agencies involved that the 
justice system in Maydan Wardak should be rebuilt to serve as a model for the 
international community and the GoA for such improvements in other provinces. 
Interagency cooperation and communications between the agencies involved in 
Wardak continues in 2007. A group of agency representatives and provincial justice 
and government officials gathers monthly in Wardak to discuss problems with and 
future plans for further expansion of the Wardak Model Justice Project. Visibility on 
this project remains high as the provincial governor continues to chair each monthly 
meeting. Participants from all USG agencies are invited to these meetings, as well as 
representatives of the international community and various NGOs. The recently 
arrived Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) brought a police training team 
with them, and this program has been incorporated into the Wardak Model Justice 
Project. Similar efforts are being planned for Nangarhar, Bamyian, and Logar 
provinces as part of raj wider OOS strategic plan for implementation of its rule of law 
programY 
While the Wardak Project dearly illustrates the benefits that can be achieved 
when several agencies each work toward a common end, much of the success 
achieved in Wardak was more a product of coincidence than of premeditated coor-
dination on the part of the agencies involved. In the vast majority of cases, consci-
entious, institutionalized coordination will be needed, as illustrated by the 
following example: 
In early 2006. a Special Counselor on the Rule of Law was appointed by the DOS to 
coordinate interagency rule of law efforts in Afghanistan, to assure that gaps and 
overlaps in such efforts were corrected, and to assist in the development of a broader 
USG rule of law agenda . . .. A comminee of representatives from each USG agency 
involved in rule of law activities was organized and was chaired by the Special 
Counselor who was later replaced by a senior lawyer who currently holds the title of 
Rule of Law Coordinator .. .. Regular and frequent rule oflaw meetings have resulted 
in much greater coordination of rule of law efforts at the strategic level, the 
development of strong interpersonal and cooperative relationships, and a greater 
awareness of each agency's rule of law activities among and between all participants 
and the rule oflaw [sic] Coordinator.34 
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If the Provincial Justice Conferences program, the creation of the office of RuJe 
of Law Coordinator and the Wardak Project are indicative of the future of inter-
agency and international coordination, there is much to be optimistic about con-
cerning rule oflaw operations in Afghanistan. The d ear lesson learned is that it is 
only through complete coordination and indusion of host-nation components 
that all the disparate efforts to promote rule of law within Afghanistan can be 
successful. 
Ill. To Be Effective, Military Rule of Law Operations Must Be Effects-Based 
In October 2002 after a year of operations in Afghanistan, Desmond Saunders-
Newton and Aaron B. Frank wrote in a National Defense University publication 
that 
[tJhe u.s. military, under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense, is moving toward a 
new concept of military planning and operations that is agile and adaptable to the 
conflict at hand .. .. The new concept called effects-based operations encompasses 
processes, tools, and organizations that focus planning, executing, and assessing 
military activities for the effects produced rather than merely tallying the number of 
targets destroyed.35 
The authors go on to write that what is needed is not a "traditional force-on-
force analysis," but "the skillful use of force in conjunction with diplomatic, eco-
nomic, legal, and other instruments of national power",}/; that are characteristic of 
effects-based operations. 
This effects-based approach has been used effectively in Afghanistan, particu-
larly in rule of law initiativesY Because effects-based operations are "fundamen-
tally about linking end states and objectives to tactical tasks through identifying 
and producing desired effects to accomplish missions,"38 it is vital for JAs to focus 
on the effect desired, rather than on the project that mayor may not accomplish 
this effect. This is reflected in the Rule of Law Handbook, which states: 
[I]tlstitutiotlal improvements can be valuable, but rule of law projects should 
ultimately focus on bringing about particular effects, not on the institutions that may 
exist following the completion of the project. Thus, it is critical to keep in mind what 
values are represented by the rule of law so that those values, not some intermediate, 
institutionally focused objectives, drive the rule of law efforts.39 
To illustrate this point, consider the administrative functioning of a court sys-
tem. In many areas of Afghanistan, the court system had no administrative 
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structure, such as a docketing and case-tracking system, or method of reporting 
and documenting case decisions. As JAs recognize the need to institutionalize case 
administration, they may be tempted to tl)' and recreate a modern court system, 
complete with computerized databases and transfer and recording capabilities. 
However, one of the lessons learned from such efforts in Afghanistan is that "it is 
usually better to favor low-tech solutions, such as manual court reporting and pa-
per filing systems."40 More modern systems require trained computer personnel to 
operate and maintain the systems. Even more basic, such systems require continu-
ous access to electricity. While these aspects of running a court system may not be 
issues in the United States, they are significant constraints in Afghanistan and 
other similar situations where the US Army operates. Such considerations cause 
the Rule of Law Handbook to conclude, "[w]hen it comes to administrative infra-
structure, the clear lesson is that simplicity is key. "41 
The lesson here is that a JA who is not focused on effects may instead focus on 
creating the best administrative court system possible, using the most modern 
technologies. However, if the effect desired is a functioning administrative court 
system that can effectively maintain itself, a concentration on low-tech solutions is 
much more likely to succeed. 
While this is a simplistic example, a similar analysis can be applied to rule oflaw 
operations generally. Important initiatives, such as establishing a defense bar, en-
suring a trained and independent judiciary, establishing judicial oversight on po-
lice activities and maintaining a penal system that complies with fundamental 
human rights, all benefit from an effects-based approach. 
A comprehensive and effective effects-based approach to rule oflaw operations 
has several components; the first is the completion of an initial assessment. Such 
assessments look at the current and prior situations and develop a factual founda-
tion upon which future actions can occur. These assessments are often done in the 
US Army by civil affairs personnel, but every "Judge Advocate engaged in the rule 
oflaw mission must become comfortable with creating and reviewing assessments 
of fo reign nations' legal systems, including courts, private organizations, police, 
and prisons. "42 Such assessments should include the history and tradition of the 10-
cal legal system, identification of which persons and organizations have a role in 
the system, and what capabilities and needs currently exist. 43 A good assessment 
that is continually updated will provide the foundation for rule of law operations 
that can focus on and accomplish the desired rule of law effects. 
A second component, and one of the most difficult aspects of effect-based oper-
ations, is determining measures of effectiveness that will accurately reflect whether 
the desired effects have been achieved. Metrics, which are quantitative or qualita-
tive systems of measurement, have become an important part of assessing rule of 
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law effectiveness. "Meaningful metries permit the Judge Advocate . . . to not only 
measure whether the mission is accomplishing its goals, but to also convey infor-
mation to superiors and policy makers in a quantifiable manner that is not purely 
anecdotal."44 An example of a meaningful metr ic measuring overall movement to-
ward the rule of law would incorporate individuals' perceptions of whether (or to 
what degree) the law is superior to individuals, is applied by an impartial and inde-
pendent body and is applied consistently to all subjects. 
In attempting to develop metries that measure success, it is tempting to revert to 
focusing on means rather than effects. The Rule of Law Handbook reminds us why 
this urge must be overcome: 
At the sustained deployment stage, merely focusing upon the nwnber of court houses 
operating, the number of prison cells available, and the nwnber of judges hearing a 
given number of cases begins to tell an increasingly irrelevant story. Now operations 
are moving into the higher realm of what constitutes establishment of the rule oflaw. A 
tyrannical system despised by its population can have courthouses, cells, and case 
adjudication statistics and yet the rule of law does not exist. Once a plateau of recovery 
is reached where the facilities and personnel exist to operate the legal system, then the 
metrics upon which assessments and planning are built must shift to analyzing the 
effimcy and legitimacy of the system.4S 
The veracity of the effects-based approach is echoed in a recent publication from 
the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Michael McCoy writes that Provincial Re-
construction Teams 
should design measures of effectiveness that delineate the perception of safety, the 
reduction of security incidences that impact daily life, the capacity of the government 
to provide basic services and rule of law, and the popular acceptance of legitimate 
formal and informal organizations and leaders by both the majority of the population 
and disaffected elements of the population.46 
Designing metrics that adequately measure the desired effects and provide use-
ful input into the way forward is a difficult task. It is easy to see why Samuel Young, 
writing concerning V Corps operations, concludes that "[tlhe complexity of con-
ducting non-lethal Effects Based Operations in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovern-
mental, and Multinational (J UM) environment challenges the mindset, training, 
and organization of our warfighting formations ."47 
Despite some difficulties, this effects-based approach has been utilized with great 
success in Afghanistan by members of the 10th Mountain Division whose experi-
ences were recorded in a recent Initial Impressions Report. Prior to deployment, the 
division developed a comprehensive effects-based plan to guide it during its year in 
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Afghanistan. Its objectives were to improve security; support the local, provincial 
and national governments; and improve local and provincial infrastructure. 
Beginning with their campaign plan. operational desired effects were identified as 
"results/conditions" that [.1 when achieved, represent accomplishing stated objectives. 
Desired effects were clearly articulated for each operational objective that in turn 
served as guides for developing tactical missions and tasks for subordinate units. 
Throughout all planning and coordination activities, the staffwasdisciplined to review 
stated effects in the campaign plan and then develop activities and tasks to help 
generate the stated desired effects. 
The Division's operations were assessment driven. Daily, weekly. and monthly 
assessments of the progress of operations helped determine what [Combined Joint 
Task Forcel-76 was doing right and what areas of the plan needed adjustment. These 
assessments were focused on both measures of performance of tasks and measures of 
effectiveness in achieving desired effects.48 
The Initial Impressions Report concludes by stating that " [t ]he Division is very 
comfortable with using an effects-based approach to guide operations" and "[t ]he 
1 Oth [Mountain] was clearly very successful during their year in Afghanistan. " 49 
Though reformulating efforts to focus on effects and finding meaningful met-
rics to measure these effects may be difficult, it is dear that the effects-based ap-
proach to rule oflaw operations is the most effective. The lesson learned for JAs is 
that they must adopt and internalize the effects-based approach and become fully 
engaged in the metries process of assessment and analysis. 
IV. Conclusion 
As is aptly illustrated by the Naval War College's dedication of a complete work-
shop and volume of the "Blue Book" to this topic, there are numerous lessons to be 
learned from the current military operations in Afghanistan. For the US Army, 
some of the most significant legal lessons have been in the area of rule oflaw opera-
tions. The Army is still in the process of learning many of these lessons, but some 
have already been put into practice, benefitting operations in Iraq. As we continue 
to apply what we have learned by integrating the rule oflaw into military practice, 
cooperating with other agencies and measuring the success of our operations by 
their effects, future rule of law efforts will better serve the US strategic national 
interest. 
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